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Abstract—In this paper, we study the problem of physical
layer security in large-scale multiple input multiple output (LS-
MIMO) systems. The large number of antenna elements in LS-
MIMO system is exploited to enhance transmission security and
improve system performance, especially when the eavesdropper
is closer to the information source and has more antennas than
the legitimate user. However, in practical systems, the problem
becomes challenging because the eavesdropper channel state
information (CSI) is usually unavailable without cooperation and
the legitimate CSI may be imperfect due to channel estimation
error. In this paper, we first analyze the performance of physical
layer security without eavesdropper CSI and with imperfect
legitimate CSI, and then propose an energy-efficient power
allocation scheme to meet the demand for wireless security and
quality of service (QoS) simultaneously. Finally, numerical results
validate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast nature of wireless channels enables the free-
dom to communicate at anywhere, but also leads to informa-
tion leakage. Traditionally, information security is realized by
using cryptography technology. In fact, secrecy transmission
can be realized through physical layer security by exploiting
the channel fading and noise, which avoids the utilization
of cryptography methods [1] [2]. In brief, as long as the
eavesdropper channel is degraded, it is likely to provide the
secure transmission based on physical layer security.
The performance of physical layer security is usually mea-
sured by secrecy rate, defined as the difference between the
legitimate channel capacity and the eavesdropper channel
capacity [3]. It is generally known that multi-antenna system
can improve the desired channel capacity and impair the
undesired channel capacity simultaneously by making use of
its unique spatial degrees of freedom. Thus, physical layer
security combining with multi-antenna techniques draws con-
siderable research attentions [4]-[6]. In [7] and [8], the optimal
beamforming design methods for MISO and MIMO wiretap
channels were given by maximizing the secrecy rate respec-
tively, assuming that the multi-antenna information source had
full legitimate and eavesdropper channel state information
(CSI). However, in practical systems, the eavesdropper CSI
is difficult to be obtained. It is proved that if there is no
eavesdropper CSI and no artificial noise in the transmit signals,
the beamforming along the direction of the legitimate channel
is optimal [9] [10]. In this case, since the source has no
knowledge of the eavesdropper channel that varies randomly,
it is impossible to maintain a steady secrecy rate over all
realization over fading channels. Hence, the secrecy outage
capacity is adopted as a useful and intuitive metric to evaluate
security, which is defined as the maximum available rate under
the condition that the probability that the real transmission rate
is greater than the secrecy rate is equal to a given value [11]
[12].
In addition to the achievement of CSI, there are other
problems to be solved in physical layer security. For example,
the eavesdropper may be closer to the information source and
has more antennas than the secure user (SU), such that the
secrecy outage capacity is quite small in order to guarantee the
security. In this context, even though the multi-antenna gain
is exploited, it will be a challenging task to realize a secure,
reliable and efficient information transmission with traditional
multi-antenna techniques. Recently, the concept of large-scale
MIMO (LS-MIMO) has been proposed to significantly im-
prove the performance by taking advantage of its large array
gain [13]. Intuitively, due to the high spatial resolution of LS-
MIMO systems, the information leaked to the eavesdropper
is very small. Thus, the information security can be achieved
with a high probability. Inspired by this, we introduce the
LS-MIMO technique into physical layer security. As shown
later, by increasing the number of antennas at the information
source, stringent security requirement can be met even with
high QoS constraint.
However, the use of LS-MIMO is not without challenge. In
LS-MIMO systems, the transmitter commonly obtains the CSI
via channel reciprocity in time division duplex (TDD) systems
[14]. However, due to a large number of antenna elements
in LS-MIMO systems, channel estimation error is inevitable,
resulting in CSI mismatch and thus performance loss [15]. In
this paper, we will investigate the effect of imperfect CSI in
LS-MIMO systems on the secrecy outage capacity.
In addition, it is also important for a wireless communica-
tions system to gurantee a certain quality of service (QoS).
In traditional MIMO systems, QoS can always be met by
increasing the transmit power. however, this is not the case
in a physical layer security system. In secure communications
based on physical layer security, the secrecy outage capacity is
not an increasing function of transmit power any more, since
both legitimate and eavesdropper channel capacities improves
as transmit power increases [16]. Therefore, it makes sense
to distribute the power according to channel conditions, e.g.
interception distance. In this paper, we propose an energy-
efficient power allocation scheme by maximizing the ratio
of secrecy outage capacity and power consumption, namely
energy efficiency (bits per Joule), while fulfilling security and
QoS requirements.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first give
an overview of the secure LS-MIMO system and investigate
the impact of imperfect CSI on the secrecy outage capacity in
Section II, and then derive an energy-efficient power allocation
scheme by maximizing the secrecy energy efficiency while
satisfying the secrecy, QoS and power constraints in Section
III. In Section IV, we present some numerical results to
validate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. Finally, we
conclude the whole paper in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Secure User
Base Station
Eavesdropper
Fig. 1. An overview of the secure LS-MIMO system model.
We consider an LS-MIMO downlink, where a base station
(BS) with Nt antennas communicates with a single antenna
secure user (SU), while a passive eavesdropper with Nr
antennas also receives the signal from the BS due to the
broadcast nature of the wireless channel, and tries to detect
the message. Note that the number of BS antennas Nt can be
very large in an LS-MIMO system. We use h to denote the Nt
dimensional legitimate channel vector from the BS to the SU,
where h is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG)
random vector with zero mean and unit variance. Similarly, we
use αG to denote the Nr × Nt eavesdropper channel matrix
from the BS to the eavesdropper, where α is the relative path
loss and G is the small scale fading matrix with i.i.d. zero
mean and unit variance complex Gaussian entries, respectively.
Note that a large α means that the eavesdropper is close to
the BS, and thus the interception ability of the eavesdropper
is strong. If α = 1, the eavesdropper has the same access
distance as the SU. It is assumed that α remains constant
during a relatively long time period due to its slow fading
and is known at the BS, while h and G remain constant in a
time slot and independently fade slot by slot. The network is
operated in time division duplex (TDD) mode, so the channel
reciprocity holds true.
At the beginning of each time slot, the SU transmits the pilot
for channel estimation at the BS. Due to a large number of
antennas and limited channel estimation capacity, there may
be channel estimation error. Commonly, the CSI mismatch
caused by estimation error can be modeled as [17]
h = √ρhˆ +
√
1− ρe, (1)
where hˆ is the estimated CSI with the same distribution as h,
and e is the estimation error noise with i.i.d. zero mean and
unit variance complex Gaussian entries. ρ, scaling from 0 to
1, is the correlation coefficient between h and hˆ. The larger
the correlation coefficient, the more accurate the estimation.
If ρ = 1, the BS has perfect CSI. We assume the BS knows
the statistics ρ. Note that the BS always has partial CSI by
making use of channel reciprocity, so we do not consider the
case of ρ = 0 in this paper.
According to the estimated CSI hˆ, the BS performs maxi-
mum ratio transmission (MRT), namely designing the transmit
beam w = hˆ
‖hˆ‖ . Thus, the received signals at the SU and the
eavesdropper are given by
ys =
√
PhHwx+ ns (2)
and
ye =
√
PαGwx+ ne, (3)
respectively, where x is the Gaussian distributed transmit
signal with unit variance, P is the transmit power, ns and
ne are the additive Gaussian white noises with unit variance
at the SU and the eavesdropper, respectively. While there are
many available methods to detect the intercepted signal ye at
the eavesdropper, e.g. antenna selection (AS), maximum ratio
combination (MRC), zero-forcing (ZF) and minimum mean
square error (MMSE), we only consider the AS in this paper.
Specifically, during each time slot, the eavesdropper selects
one antenna with the strongest gain to receive and detect the
intercepted signal. Hence, the capacities of the legitimate and
eavesdropper channels can be expressed as
Cs = W log2(1 + γs) (4)
and
Ce = W log2(1 + γe), (5)
where W is the spectrum bandwidth, γs = P |hHw|2 and γe =
max
1≤i≤Nr
Pα2|giw|2 are the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the
SU and the eavesdropper respectively, and gi is the ith row
of G. For the legitimate channel capacity Cs in an LS-MIMO
system with imperfect CSI, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1: As Nt approaches infinity, the legitimate channel
capacity Cs asymptotically approaches W log2(ρPNt).
Proof: Please refer to the Appendix.
From an information-theoretic view, the secrecy rate is given
by Csec = [Cs − Ce]+, where [x]+ = max(x, 0). Since there
is no knowledge of the eavesdropper channel at the BS, it
is impossible to maintain a steady secrecy capacity over all
realizations over fading channels. In this paper, we take the
secrecy outage capacity Rsec as the performance metric, which
is defined as the maximum achievable rate under the condition
that the outage probability that the transmission rate surpasses
the secrecy rate is equal to a given value ε, namely
Pr (Rsec > Cs − Ce) = ε. (6)
Substituting (5) and (27) into (6), the outage probability can
be transformed as
ε = Pr
(
γe > ρPNt2
−Rsec/W − 1
)
= 1− Fγe
(
ρPNt2
−Rsec/W − 1
)
, (7)
where Fγe(x) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of
γe. Since w is independent of gj for an arbitrary j, |gjw|2 is
exponentially distributed. Thus, according to the order theory,
we have
Fγe(x) =
(
1− exp
(
− x
Pα2
))Nr
. (8)
Substituting (8) into (7), it is obtained that
ε = 1−
(
1− exp
(
−ρPNt2
−Rsec/W − 1
Pα2
))Nr
. (9)
Remark: The secrecy outage probability ε is a monotonically
increasing function of Nr and a monotonically decreasing
function of Nt. As Nr increases, the secrecy outage probability
ε will increase for a given secrecy outage capacity Rsec. To
solve this problem, by letting Nt → ∞, ε asymptotically
approaches 0, the security requirement can be guaranteed
nearly with probability 1. Hence, in an LS-MIMO system,
when the BS is equipped with a large number of antennas,
even the eavesdropper is closer to the BS (i.e. α > 1) and
has more antennas than the SU, the BS can still support a
high transmission rate with a low outage probability, and then
meets both secrecy and QoS requirements.
Given transmit power P and the requirement of outage
probability ε, the secrecy outage capacity can be expressed
as
Rsec = −W log2
(
1− Pα2 ln (1− (1− ε)1/Nr)
ρPNt
)
. (10)
From (9), we can also obtain the probability of positive secrecy
capacity as
Pr(Csec > 0) =
(
1− exp
(
−ρPNt − 1
Pα2
))Nr
. (11)
Intuitively, the probability Pr(Csec > 0) increases as
Nt increases and decreases as α and Nr increase, which
also proves that we can easily solve the problems that the
eavesdropper is closer to the BS and has more antennas than
the SU by adding the antennas at the BS in an LS-MIMO
system.
III. ENERGY-EFFICIENT POWER ALLOCATION
Considering the demand for green communication, we at-
tempt to derive a secure and efficient power allocation scheme
to maximize the secrecy energy efficiency while satisfying the
secrecy, QoS and power constraints, which is equivalent to the
following optimization problem:
J1 : max
Rsec
P0 + P
(12)
s.t. ε ≤ εmax (13)
Rsec ≥ Rmin (14)
P ≤ Pmax, (15)
where P is the transmit power as defined in Section II, and
P0 is the constant power consumption in the transmit filter,
mixer, frequency synthesizer and digital-to-analog converter,
which are independent of the actual transmit power. (12) is
the so called secrecy energy efficiency, defined as the number
of transmission bits per Joule. (13) is used to fulfill the secrecy
requirement based on physical layer security, and (14) is
the QoS constraint, where Rmin is the minimum effective
transmission rate to meet a given QoS requirement, such
as delay provisioning. Pmax is the constraint on maximum
transmit power. Since ε is a monotonically increasing function
of Rsec and a decreasing function of P , the condition of
ε = εmax is optimal in the sense of maximizing the secrecy
energy efficiency. Thus, (13) can be canceled and Rsec can
be replaced by −W log2
(
1−Pα2 ln(1−(1−εmax)1/Nr)
ρPNt
)
. Notice
that there may be no feasible solution for J1, due to the
stringent secrecy, QoS and power constraints. Under such a
condition, in order to obtain a solution, that will fulfill the
requirements, we can increase the number of antennas at
the BS, which is the promising advantage of the LS-MIMO
system.
The objective function (12) in a fractional program is a
ratio of two functions of the optimization variable P , resulting
in that J1 is a fractional programming problem, which is
in general nonconvex. Following [16], the objective func-
tion is equivalent to −W log2
(
1−Pα2 ln(1−(1−εmax)1/Nr)
ρPNt
)
−
q⋆(P0 + P ) by exploiting the properties of fractional pro-
gramming, where q⋆ is the secrecy energy efficiency when
P is equal to the optimal power P ⋆ of J1, namely q⋆ =
−W log2
(
1−P⋆α2 ln(1−(1−εmax)1/Nr )
ρP⋆Nt
)
(P0+P⋆)
. Thus, J1 is transformed
as
J2 : minW log2
(
1− Pα2 ln (1− (1− εmax)1/Nr)
ρPNt
)
+q⋆(P0 + P ) (16)
s.t. P ≥ 1
α2 ln
(
1− (1 − εmax)1/Nr
)
+ ρNt2−Rmin/W
= Pmin (17)
P ≤ Pmax. (18)
J2, as a convex optimization problem, can be solved by
the Lagrange multiplier method. By some arrangement, its
Lagrange dual function can be written as
L(µ, ν, P ) = W log2
(
1− Pα2 ln (1− (1− εmax)1/Nr)
ρPNt
)
+ q⋆(P0 + P )− µP + µPmin + νP − νPmax,
(19)
where µ ≥ 0 and ν ≥ 0 are the Lagrange multipliers
corresponding to the constraint (17) and (18), respectively.
Therefore, the dual problem of J2 is given by
max
µ,ν
min
P
L(µ, ν, P ). (20)
Given µ and ν, the optimal power P ⋆ can be derived by
solving the following KKT condition
∂L(µ, ν, P )
∂P
=
W
ln 2(P 2α2 ln
(
1− (1− εmax)1/Nr
)− P )
−q⋆ − µ+ ν = 0. (21)
Moreover, µ and ν can be updated by the gradient method,
which are given by
µ(n+ 1) = [µ(n)−△µ(Pmin − P )]+ (22)
and
ν(n+ 1) = [ν(n)−△ν(P − Pmax)]+, (23)
where n is the iteration index, and △µ and △ν are the positive
iteration steps. Inspired by the Dinkelbach method [18], we
propose an iterative algorithm as follows
Algorithm 1: Energy-Efficient Power Allocation
1) Initialization: Given Nt, Nr W , α, ρ, Rmin, P0, Pmax,
△µ, △ν and εmax. Let µ = 0, ν = 0, P = 0 and
q⋆ = −W log2
(
1−Pα2 ln(1−(1−εmax)1/Nr )
ρPNt
)
/(P0 +P ).
ǫ is a sufficiently small positive real number.
2) Update µ and ν according to (22) and (23), respectively.
3) Computing the optimal P ⋆ by solving the equation (21).
4) If −W log2
(
1−P⋆α2 ln(1−(1−εmax)1/Nr)
ρP⋆Nt
)
− q⋆(P0 +
P ⋆) > ǫ, then set q⋆ =
−W log2
(
1−P⋆α2 ln(1−(1−εmax)1/Nr)
ρP⋆Nt
)
/(P0+P
⋆), and
go to 2). Otherwise, P ⋆ is the optimal transmit power.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
To examine the effectiveness of the proposed energy-
efficient power allocation scheme, we present several numer-
ical results in the following scenarios: we set Nt = 20,
Nr = 2, W = 1MHz, Rmin = 1.5Mb/s, P0 = 0.5Watt
and Pmax = 10Watt. It is found that the proposed energy-
efficient power allocation scheme converges after no more than
20 times iterative computation in all simulation scenarios.
Fig.2 compares the secrecy energy efficiency of the pro-
posed energy-efficient and the fixed power allocation schemes
with εmax = 0.05, ρ = 0.8 and Nt = 20. Note that we
set P = Pmax fixedly for the fixed scheme. As seen in
Fig.2, the proposed scheme performs better than the fixed one,
especially when α is small. For example, when α = 1, there is
about 1.3Mb/J gain. It is worth pointing out that our proposed
scheme uses less power than the fixed scheme. Therefore, the
proposed scheme is more suitable for the future green and
secure communications.
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Fig. 2. Performance comparison of the fixed and the proposed power
allocation schemes.
Fig.3 investigates the effect of the outage probability re-
quirements on the secrecy energy efficiency of the proposed
scheme with ρ = 0.8 and Nt = 20. For a given α, as εmax
decreases, the secrecy energy efficiency reduces accordingly,
this is because more power is used to decrease the outage
probability. On the other hand, for a given outage probability
requirement, the increase of α leads to the decrease of the
secrecy energy efficiency, since the eavesdropper has a strong
eavesdropping ability. It is found that when α = 1.4 and
εmax = 0.01, the secrecy energy efficiency reduces to zero.
This is because there is no nonzero secrecy outage capacity
under such conditions. Such a challenging problem can be
easily solved in LS-MIMO systems by adding the antennas at
the BS. As seen in Fig.4, with the increase of the number of
antennas, the secrecy energy efficiency increases significantly,
especially when α is large. Thus, a secure, reliable and QoS
guaranteed communication can be realized even with short-
distance interception.
Then, we show the impact of the number of antennas at the
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Fig. 3. Performance comparison of the proposed power allocation scheme
with different requirements of secrecy outage probability.
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Fig. 4. Performance comparison of the proposed power allocation scheme
with different number of antennas at the BS.
eavesdropper on the secrecy energy efficiency of the proposed
scheme with εmax = 0.05, ρ = 0.8 and Nt = 20. As seen in
Fig.5, with the increase of Nr, the energy efficiency decreases
according, especially in the region of large α. At α = 1.4,
the secrecy energy efficiency with Nr = 4 reduces to zero.
Fortunately, this problem can be solved by adding the number
of antennas at the BS. Hence, the proposed scheme can address
the challenge that the eavesdropper has more antennas than the
SU.
Finally, we investigate the impact of imperfect CSI on the
secrecy energy efficiency of the proposed scheme with εmax =
0.01 and Nt = 40. As shown in Fig.6, even with slight CSI
mismatch, i.e. ρ = 0.95, there is performance loss with respect
to the ideal case of ρ = 1. With the increase of ρ, secrecy
energy efficiency decreases accordingly.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we show that the large number of antenna
elements of LS-MIMO system can address the problem of
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Fig. 5. Performance comparison of the proposed power allocation scheme
with different number of antennas at the eavesdropper.
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Fig. 6. Performance comparison of the proposed power allocation scheme
with different correlation coefficients.
guaranteeing both stringent security and high QoS require-
ments when the eavesdropper is closer to the BS and has more
antennas than the SU. The impact of imperfect CSI at the BS is
investigated quantitatively. We also design an energy-efficient
power allocation scheme to enable a secure communication
while satisfy the QoS constraint. Our analysis and numerical
results show that LS-MIMO is an energy-efficient technique
that provides physical layer security even under some adverse
conditions.
APPENDIX
By using the transmit beam for MRT w = hˆ/‖hˆ‖, the
legitimate channel capacity can be expressed as
Cs = W log2

1 + P
∣∣∣∣∣
(√
ρhˆ +
√
1− ρe
)H hˆ
‖hˆ‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2


= W log
(
1 + ρP‖hˆ‖2 + 2ρ(1− ρ)PR(eH hˆ)
+(1− ρ)P‖ehˆH‖2/‖hˆ‖2
)
(24)
≈ W log2(1 + ρP‖hˆ‖2) (25)
≈ W log2(1 + ρPNt) (26)
≈ W log2(ρPNt), (27)
where R(x) denotes the real part of x. (25) follows the fact
that ρP‖hˆ‖2 scales with the order O(ρPNt) as Nt → ∞
while 2ρ(1− ρ)PR(eH hˆ) + (1−ρ)P‖ehˆ
H
‖2
‖hˆ‖2 scales as the order
O(1), so the third and forth terms can be negligible. (26) holds
true because of lim
Nt→∞
‖hˆ‖2
Nt
= 1, and (27) neglects the constant
1 in the case of large Nt. Therefore, we get the Lemma 1.
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